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CRA WFORD v. WASHINGTON:




In early 2004, the Supreme Court handed down Crawford
v. Washington,2 a decision that "redefines the scope and effect of
the Confrontation Clause."3 Specifically, Crawford reframed the
analysis used by courts faced with hearsay that falls into a
recognized exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Before
Crawford, if a hearsay statement was admissible under the Federal
Rules, it was presumed to simultaneously satisfy any
Confrontation Clause requirements. After Crawford, courts must
employ a two-step analysis for hearsay statements. First, courts
must determine whether the statement is testimonial in nature.
Then, if the statement is deemed testimonial, the courts must then
J.D. Candidate, Touro Law Center, 2005. The author wishes to thank her
parents for their love and support, her sister and brother-in-law for their
encouragement, and the 2004 World Series Champion Boston Red Sox for
finally winning it all.
2 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
3 United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).
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analyze whether its admission would offend the Sixth
Amendment.4
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
mandates that criminal defendants have an opportunity to examine
the witnesses against them, a procedural guarantee that applies
with equal force to both federal and state criminal proceedings.'
The Founders adopted England's common-law system, which
favored "live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing" -
in other words, testimony subject to cross-examination.6 Despite
this general practice, however, abuses occurred in the English
courts under sixteenth and seventeenth-century statutes requiring
pre-trial examination of suspects and witnesses.7 These statutes
mirrored the civil law practices on the Continent, where private
examination by judicial officers was the normal practice These
examinations produced ex parte affidavits that were subsequently
used against the accused in open court.9 In response to politicized
4 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
5 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment's right
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is... a fundamental right.").
6 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
7 Id. at 1360 (citing I & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) and 2 & 3 id., c 10 (1555)).
8 Id. at 1359.
9 See, e.g., CRIMINAL TRIALs 389-520 (David A. Jardine ed., 1850). Sir Walter
Raleigh was tried for high treason, based upon the confession of his alleged
conspirator, Lord Cobham, who claimed he and Raleigh had planned to kill the
King and put Arabella Stuart into power. Cobham later retracted his
accusations. At Raleigh's trial, the Attorney General, Sir Edward Coke, used
232 [Vol 21
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trials like that of Sir Walter Raleigh, where untested written
statements were used to prosecute (or, arguably, to persecute)
defendants, English law "developed a right of confrontation that
limited these abuses."'"
As the concept of a right to confront adverse witnesses
evolved, British courts struggled with procedural protections meant
to balance the defendants' rights against the court's need for every
person's testimony. When faced with the unavailability of a
deceased witness, the Court of the King's Bench held that "the
admissibility of an unavailable witness's pretrial examination
depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to
cross-examine him."" This case, King v. Paine, illustrated the
common-law rule requiring the opportunity for cross-examination
before allowing evidence to be introduced against criminal
defendants. 12
As the Supreme Court noted in Pointer v. Texas, American
courts have adopted this procedural protection:
Cobham's statements, yet Cobham himself did not testify. Raleigh, at trial,
challenged the Attorney-General:
If you proceed to condemn me here by bare inferences,
without an oath, without a subscription, without witnesses,
upon a paper accusation, you try me by the Spanish
Inquisition. If my accuser were dead or abroad, it were
something; but he liveth .... Why, then, I beseech you, my
Lords, let Cobham be sent for; let him be charged upon his
soul; upon his allegiance to the King, and if he will then
maintain his accusation to my face, I will confess myself
guilty.
Id. at 418-20.
'o Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360 (citing 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (treason
statute requiring "face to face" confrontation of witnesses)).
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There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this
Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that
the right of confrontation and cross-examination is
an essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal. 3
In fact, "the particular vice that gave impetus to the
confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on
'evidence' which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or
depositions . . thus denying the defendant the opportunity to
challenge his accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front of the
trier of fact."' 4  During debates over the ratification of the
American Constitution, this concern about a defendant's right to
confront adverse witnesses fueled some of the controversy.
Antifederalists objected to ratification without the guarantees that
would become the Bill of Rights in part because they feared
prosecution upon ex parte statements. 15  The first Congress
responded to such criticism, says the Crawford Court, "by
including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the
Sixth Amendment."' 6 The Supreme Court has traditionally been
mindful, however, of the need to balance the Sixth Amendment
right of criminal defendants to confront adverse witnesses against
12 Id.
13 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405.
14 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
15 See Green, 399 U.S. at 156.
16 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363.
234 [Vol 21
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"a societal interest in accurate factfinding, which may require
consideration of out-of-court statements."'"
III. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
To be considered competent to offer testimony, witnesses
are required by the Federal Rules of Evidence to have "personal
knowledge of the matter."' 8 This requirement is described in the
Advisory Committee Notes as a manifestation of "the common-law
insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information.' "" An
individual who personally witnessed an event is more likely to
have relevant, credible information to share with the court than
someone who learned of the events second-hand. This rationale
explains the general prohibition against allowing 'second-hand
testimony - hearsay - into evidence. Since a witness other than
the person who made the statement introduces hearsay evidence,
its reliability is suspect. In the context of a criminal prosecution, if
the accused is denied the opportunity to cross-examine the person
who made the incriminating statement, this raises concerns about
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. -0
'" Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
18 FED. R. EVID. 602.
'9 FED. R. EvID. 602 advisory committee's note (quoting JOHN W. STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 10 (5th ed. 1999)).
20 Allowing hearsay into evidence only presents a Confrontation Clause
problem when such evidence is offered against a criminal defendant. Civil
plaintiffs, civil defendants, and government prosecutors do not enjoy a
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The Congress codified the general prohibitions against
allowing hearsay testimony into evidence in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Rules define hearsay as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'"
After declaring hearsay to be generally inadmissible,22 the Federal
Rules of Evidence list several exemptions and exceptions. 3 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "certain exceptions
... are thought to be justified because statements made under the
specified circumstances have a high degree of reliability."24 The
excited utterance exception, for example, is considered reliable
because someone "under the stress of excitement caused by [an]
event" does not have the time to reflect or confabulate but instead
speaks the truth.25 In Idaho v. Wright,26 the Supreme Court
explained that excited utterances are presumptively reliable: "such
statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the
possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that
therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the
21'FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
22 FED. R. EvID. 802. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules...." Id.
21 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2). "The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: ... (2) Excited
utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."
24 Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2004).
25 See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Donovan, 768 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. App. 1989)
("A statement made while in a condition of excitement theoretically stills the
capacity for reflection and prevents fabrication.").
26 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
236 [Vol 21
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statement provide sufficient assurances that the statement is
trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. 27
The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts28 addressed the
potential gap between the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth
Amendment. At Roberts' trial, one witness was unavailable to
testify; consequently, the prosecution introduced testimony given
at a preliminary hearing by the unavailable witness.29 After
conviction, the defendant challenged admission of the hearsay
evidence, arguing that it violated his right to confront the witness.3"
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court
weighed the traditional preference for testimony tested for
accuracy by cross-examination against the competing public
interest in effective law enforcement.3
The Roberts decision set forth "a 'general approach' for
determining when incriminating statements admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause."32  Evidence prohibited by the Sixth
Amendment may not always precisely overlap with evidence
prohibited by the rule against hearsay.33 While the Federal Rules
may provide an exception - for example, business records - that
would encompass proffered testimony, the records may still violate
the Sixth Amendment and be barred. Conversely, hearsay
27 Id. at 820.
28 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
29 ld. at 58-59.
30 Id. at 59.
31 Id. at 64.
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testimony offered by a criminal defendant against a witness of the
prosecution does not offend the Sixth Amendment, but may still be
barred if it does not fall within an exception to the rule against
hearsay.
Roberts and other hearsay cases identified two major
categories of hearsay statements that implicate the Confrontation
Clause. The first category includes prior statements of a testifying
witness34 and former testimony subject to cross-examination.35
Because the defendant has an opportunity in either of these
situations to cross-examine the declarant, the courts reasoned that
the prior or current opportunity for cross-examination satisfies the
Confrontation Clause.36 This opportunity for cross-examination
comports with what the Roberts Court termed "the Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation."37  The Federal Rules of
33 Id
" See Green, 399 U.S. at 149. Prior statements by witnesses are included
among the exemptions to the general prohibition against hearsay in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and allowed into evidence if they are inconsistent with
current testimony (for impeaching a witness), consistent with the current
testimony (for rehabilitating impeached witness), or a prior statement of
identification. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
35 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Former testimony is excepted from
the Federal Rules hearsay prohibition when the declarant is unavailable, which
may happen when the declarant claims a privilege, refuses to testify, cannot
recall the relevant events, is incapacitated or dead, or is absent and unable to be
brought into court. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
36 Green, 399 U.S. at 158 ("[T]here is good reason to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declaran"s out-of-court
statements, as long as the declarant is testifying . . . and subject to full and
effective cross-examination.").
37 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
238 [Vol 21
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Evidence include "prior statement by [a] witness" among the
exemptions to the rule against hearsay.38
The second category identified in Roberts raises potential
Sixth Amendment problems. When a declarant's statements have
not previously been subjected to cross-examination, they may still
be admissible under an exception to the rule against hearsay.
Unlike the first category, determining that a statement falls within
a recognized hearsay exception does not simultaneously end the
Sixth Amendment analysis since there was no opportunity for
cross-examination. This second category was further divided by
the Roberts Court into two subcategories: firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions, and statements that carry particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.39 Both require a closer examination to ensure that
a criminal defendant's right to confrontation is not violated. The
Roberts Court found two separate ways in which the Confrontation
Clause restricts admissible hearsay:
[I]n conformance with the Framers' preference for
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case
(including cases where prior cross-examination has
occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant
whose statement it wishes to use against the
defendant. . . . [Secondly,] [r]eflecting its
underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the
factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an
effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause
38 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). The Rule requires that the prior statement be
inconsistent with the testimony for impeachment purposes, consistent with the
testimony to rebut impeachment, or one of identification.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2005
TOURO LA WREVIEW
countenances only hearsay marked with such
trustworthiness that "there is no material departure
from the reason of the general rule.
40
In other words, if the statement sought to be introduced was
not elicited in a setting that provided the defendant with a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement, there
must be some other "indicia of reliability ...though there is no
confrontation of the declarant."4  When faced with hearsay, the
Court has traditionally focused its analyses on the reliability of the
statement to determine whether the statement would offend the
Sixth Amendment. As the Supreme Court explained in California
v. Green:
[T]he question as we see it must be ...whether
subsequent cross-examination at the defendant's
trial will still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.
On that issue, neither evidence nor reason convinces
us that contemporaneous cross-examination before
the ultimate trier of fact is so much more effective
than subsequent examination that it must be made
the touchstone of the Confrontation Clause.4 -
The Roberts Court went further, concluding that some
exceptions to the rule against hearsay "rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
40 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107
(1934)).
41 Id. at 65 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
42 Green, 399 U.S. at 160-61.
240 [Vol 21
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 21 [2005], No. 1, Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/23
CONFRONTATION CLA USE
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "'I
The Supreme Court announced that the statement of an unavailable
declarant "is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of
reliability ... [which] can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.""
Under Roberts, then, statements that do not fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, but which exhibit "particularized
guarantees of tru~stworthiness," may be admissible even without an
opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the declarant.45 The
Court in Idaho v. Wright elaborated, instructing courts to find such
guarantees by examining the totality of the circumstances, but
"only those [circumstances] that surround the making of the
statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of
belief."46 Hearsay statements that fall into recognized exceptions
would therefore be admitted into evidence whenever the court
determined that the statement was reliable, regardless of whether
the criminal defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination.
In White v. Illinois, the Supreme Court confirmed that a statement
falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception is so trustworthy
that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its
4' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
44Id. (internal quotes omitted).
45 Id.
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reliability."47 In short, if the prosecution can persuade the court
that the proffered statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, no further Confrontation Clause inquiry is needed. This
category, therefore, does not require that the prosecution make
good faith efforts to locate the witness, only that the prosecution
convince the court that the statement falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. 8
Although the Court did not enunciate a comprehensive list
of which hearsay exceptions qualify as firmly rooted, it did
explicitly identify excited utterances, 9 statements made for
purposes of obtaining medical treatment, ° dying declarations," and
statements made during the course of and in the furtherance of a
conspiracy." The various Circuit Courts of Appeal have added
"7 White, 502 U.S. at 357.
48 Brown, 355 F.3d at 87, stating:
As a general proposition, in a criminal trial, a statement made
out of court may be admitted against the accused as evidence
of what it asserts only where the state, as the proponent of the
presumptively barred evidence, carries its burden of showing
that its admission does not violate the defendant's right of
confrontation.
49 White, 502 U.S. at 356.
50 ld. See also FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
51 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999). See also Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at
1367 n.6 ("Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is
authority for admitting even those that clearly are .... We need not decide in
this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for
testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on historical
grounds, it is sui generis.").
52 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 (1987) ("We think that the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that,
under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire
into the reliability of such statements."). See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
242 [Vol 21
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records of regularly conducted activity,53 the absence of a public
record,54 adoptive admissions,55 and statements by a party's agent 6
to the list of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. The plurality
opinion in Lilly v. Virginia suggested that statements against penal
interest do not qualify for firmly rooted status.
Essentially, the courts prior to Crawford focused on the
reliability of the hearsay statement, not the Sixth Amendment's
strict protections for criminal defendants. As long as the
prosecution could convince the court that a proffered statement fell
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or exhibited
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the statement was
admissible without any further Confrontation Clause analysis.
IV. CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON
Twenty-four years after its Roberts ruling, the Supreme
Court rejected the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
option for hearsay admissibility in Crawford v. Washington.5 ' The
53 United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The business
records exception to the hearsay rule is a firmly rooted exception."). See also
FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
54 United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[Defendant's]
counsel admitted that Rule 803(10) is 'firmly rooted' in the common law as an
exception to the hearsay rule."). See also FED. R. EvID. 803(10).
" United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also FED. R.
EviD. 801 (d)(2)(B).
56 United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525-26 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The agency
exception is equally rooted in our jurisprudence. . . . We conclude that if
statements meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) . . . the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied."). See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
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defendant, Crawford, was convicted of stabbing the man who
allegedly attempted to rape Crawford's wife, Sylvia. 9  In a
statement to police, Sylvia recounted the events leading up the
altercation; at trial, Sylvia asserted marital privilege and refused to
testify." The prosecution offered Sylvia's recorded police
statement at trial and the court admitted it as a statement against
penal interest under the Roberts particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness exception to the rule against hearsay.61 Crawford
challenged the prosecution's use of Sylvia's statement, alleging
that it violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him.62 After a lengthy historical examination of the origins
of the right to confrontation and cross-examination, 63 the United
States Supreme Court agreed that admitting such statements
violated the Sixth Amendment:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation .... [The Confrontation Clause] is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination.'
59 1d. at 1356-57.
60 Id. at 1357.
61 Id. at 1358.
62 Id
63 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-63. The Court concluded that "[t]he principal
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of exparte examinations as evidence
against the accused." Id. at 1363.
64 Id. at 1370. The Court also expressed concern over the disparate
determination of reliability under the Roberts test: "Whether a statement is
deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and how
244 [Vol 2 1
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To reach this conclusion, the Court reasoned that since the
text of the Confrontation Clause was insufficient to resolve the
issue, it was therefore necessary to undertake a historical analysis
of the concept of cross-examination.65 After an explication of the
original concerns surrounding the Confrontation Clause, the
Crawford Court expressed its displeasure with the Roberts
doctrine. The Court criticized the subjective nature of a reliability
test.66 More fundamentally, the Court was concerned with the
Roberts test's "demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude."67  The Court reasoned that "[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."68
These statements would seem to indicate that the Crawford
Court meant to impose cross-examination as an absolute
prerequisite for the admission of hearsay evidence against criminal
defendants. However, the Supreme Court then announced a new
distinction for courts analyzing out-of-court statements.
Examining the language of the Confrontation Clause, the Court
much weight he accords each of them. Some courts wind up attaching the same
significance to opposite facts." Id at 1371.
65 Id. at 1359 ("We must therefore turn to the historical background of the
Clause to understand its meaning.").
66 Id at 1371.
67 Id.
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inferred from the word "witnesses" that the Founders meant to
prohibit testimonial statements such as "ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially."69  The Crawford Court therefore overturned
Roberts to the extent that it no longer considered "particularized
guarantees of reliability" sufficient to obviate Confrontation
Clause problems with respect to testimonial hearsay. In the words
of the Colorado Supreme Court, for testimonial statements,
Crawford "rejects the reliability prong of the Roberts test in favor
of an inquiry into whether the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses."7
Consequently, the Court restricted the admission of
testimonial hearsay to cases in which the declarant is unavailable
and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination, but
declined to explicitly define testimonial hearsay.7 The Crawford
Court's distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial
hearsay applies to statements that fall into both Roberts categories,
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions and statements that exhibit
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
69 1d at 1364 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
70 People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 976 (Colo. 2004).
7' Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' "); see Cooper v. McGrath, 314
F. Supp. 2d 967, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (reasoning that unavailability after
246 [Vol 21
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V. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AFTER CRAWFORD
After Crawford, the lower courts face at least two
unresolved questions. First, what statements and scenarios qualify
as "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes? Second, what
standards apply to non-testimonial hearsay?
The Definition of Testimonial Hearsay
The lower courts have already faced several cases requiring
decisions about which statements qualify as testimonial hearsay.
The more obvious testimonial statements include plea allocutions
72
and statements to prosecutors. 3 Referring to the Crawford Court's
reliance on history, the District Court of Indiana reasoned that
"[1]ike the justices of peace in England, prosecutors are trained in
the law, and charged with the duty of assembling evidence to use
against the accused at trial."74 The court concluded that "[i]f ex
parte statements made in response to police questioning are
testimonial, then ex parte statements made by a target in response
Crawford requires the prosecutor to show a good faith effort to obtain the
witness's testimony at trial).
72 United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] plea
allocution by a co-conspirator who does not testify at trial may not be introduced
as substantive evidence against a defendant unless the co-conspirator is
unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination."); see
People v. Woods, 779 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); United States v.
Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
73 United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2004.).
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to a prosecutor's questioning, statements elicited by government
questioning 'with an eye toward trial,' must also be testimonial
statements."75 When faced with statements made to investigators
by the patient of a doctor under investigation for Medicare fraud,
the Northern District of Illinois agreed that "statements to the HHS
Agents fall within the realm of testimonial statements. 76
The lower courts have also addressed some statements that
are clearly non-testimonial in nature. The Supreme Court of
Connecticut concluded in State v. Rivera that statements or
confessions to family members were not testimonial.77 Rivera, the
defendant, was convicted of felony-murder, burglary, and arson for
robbing a home and killing the homeowner.78 Glanville, who was
with Rivera the night of the murder, subsequently confessed his
part in the crime to his nephew, Caraballo.79 When Rivera's trial
was already in progress, Caraballo was arrested on unrelated
charges; Caraballo told the police about Glanville's statements,
and then testified at Rivera's trial."0 Rivera argued that Caraballo's
account of Glanville's statements amounted to inadmissible
hearsay.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, taking Crawford into
consideration, disagreed. In determining whether Glanville's
75 Id. at 902.
76 United States v. Mikos, No. 02CR137-1, 2004 WL 2091999, at *18 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 16, 2004).
7' 844 A.2d 191 (Conn. 2004).
78 Id. at 195.
'9 1d. at 197.
' 0 Id. at 198.
248 [Vol 21
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 21 [2005], No. 1, Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/23
CONFR ONTA TION CLA USE
confession to Carabello was testimonial in nature, the Court
considered the circumstances under which it was made. Glanville,
the Court noted, "made the statement in confidence and on his own
initiative to a close family member, almost eighteen months before
the defendant was arrested."'" The Court concluded that
Glanville's statement to Caraballo "clearly does not fall within the
core category of ex parte testimonial statements that the court was
concerned with in Crawford.
' 2
The Eighth Circuit agreed that confessions to family
members do not raise Confrontation Clause concerns. United
States v. Lee involved two men, Lee and Kehoe, who broke into a
gun dealer's home; held the dealer, his wife, and her eight-year-old
daughter hostage while they searched the house for cash, guns, and
munitions; and then murdered all three victims. 3 At trial, Kehoe's
mother testified that both Lee and Kehoe had confessed the
murders to her." Lee contended that his Sixth Amendment rights
"were violated by the admission of hearsay statements made by
nontestifying codefendant Kehoe" to his mother.85
The Eighth Circuit determined that circumstances
surrounding a defendant's confession to his mother "do not raise
81 Id. at 202.
82 Rivera, 844 A.2d at 202.
83 374 F.3d 637, 641-42 (8th Cir. 2004).
84 Id. at 642. Kehoe's brother also testified that Kehoe had confessed the
murders to him, but since Kehoe's brother was involved in selling the stolen
weapons, the Eighth Circuit determined that these statements were admissible
because they were made to a co-conspirator in furtherance of a crime. Id. at
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the same confrontation concerns as the introduction of witness
statements previously made in court proceedings or during police
interrogations. 86 The Lee Court noted that the Supreme Court had
declined to indicate what types of statements were testimonial, and
reasoned that "Kehoe's statements were more like casual remarks
to an acquaintance than formal testimonial statements made to law
enforcement." 7 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit did not consider the
hearsay statements introduced by the mother of Lee's codefendant
to be barred by the Confrontation Clause.88
When faced with hearsay statements that do not obviously
fall into either testimonial or non-testimonial categories, the courts
have reached a consensus with respect to what definition of
"testimonial" to apply. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota
articulated three formulations of "core testimonial evidence" noted
by the Crawford Court:
(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent," such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior trial testimony not subject to
cross-examination, or "similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially"; (2) "extrajudicial statements" of
the same nature "contained in formalized
testimonial materials"; and (3) "statements that
were made under circumstances that would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the
86 1d at 645.
87 Id. at 645.
88 Lee, 374 F.3d at 645. The Eastern District of Illinois concurs in the Lee
court's reasoning and has held that declarant's statements to her family and
friends were admissible because "[t]here was no government involvement in
these conversations, therefore they are not testimonial in nature and Crawford
does not apply." Mikos, 2004 WL 2091999, at *18.
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statements would be available for use at a later
trial. , 9
For example, in State v. Barnes," the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine had to determine whether reporting threats to the
police could be considered a testimonial statement. Barnes was
convicted of killing his mother. A year and a half before she was
murdered, the victim drove to the police station "sobbing and
crying" and reported that "her son had assaulted her and had
threatened to kill her more than once during the day."'91 The
defendant protested the admission of his mother's statements to the
police. Barnes argued that because his mother's statements were
made to the police, they were testimonial and nature and therefore
admission without an opportunity to cross-examine violated his
Sixth Amendment rights.92
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine weighed a number of
factors to determine whether Barnes' mother's statements were
testimonial. The Barnes court considered the circumstances,
including the facts that "the police did not seek her out," that her
statements were made "when she was still under the stress of the
assault," and that she "was not responding to tactically structured
police questioning."93  Given this factual context, the Court
89 State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). See Horton v.
Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004).
9o 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004).
91 Id. at 210. Barnes' mother was so distraught that the police called an
ambulance for her. Id.92 Id. at 211.
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distinguished this situation from Crawfords example of police
interrogations.94 "[T]he interaction between [defendant's] mother
and the officer was not structured police interrogation triggering
the cross-examination requirement of the Confrontation Clause as
interpreted by the Court in Crawford."95
Calls to 911 emergency assistance for help present similar
difficulties for the courts. In New York, courts have issued
opinions reaching opposite conclusions on whether 911 calls
qualify as testimonial under Crawford. The key difference
between People v. Cortes,96 in which the court reasoned that 911
calls are testimonial, and People v. Moscat,97' in which the court
determined that 911 calls are not testimonial, is that the former
involved a third-party witness to violence, while the latter involved
a call for help by the victim of violence.
During Cortes' trial for attempted murder, the prosecution
sought to introduce a 911 call placed by an anonymous witness to
the shooting." Since the witness did not reveal his identity to the
911 operator, he "could not be located by the prosecution and was
therefore unavailable for cross-examination. '"99 The contents of the
anonymous phone call included the intersection where the shooting
took place, a description of the shooter, and an ongoing narration
9 4 1d. at 211-12.
9' Barnes, 854 A.2d at 211-12.
96 781 N.Y.S. 2d401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
97 777 N.Y.S. 2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
98 Cortes, 781 N.Y.S. 2d at 402.
99 Id. at 403. Just before hanging up, the unidentified caller said, "I gotta hang
up because people, people are gonna think I'm out calling the cops." Id at 404.
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of events as they unfolded."° In holding such calls to be
testimonial (and, therefore, barred without an opportunity for
cross-examination), the court read Crawford broadly: "Noting the
investigative and prosecutorial functions of government officers,
the [Crawford] Court said that the involvement of any such officer
in the production of testimonial evidence presents a risk."' 1
Considering that the 911 operator worked for the police, the Cortes
court concluded that "the circumstances of some 911 calls,
particularly those reporting a crime, are within the definition of
interrogation."'' 2
The specific call at issue in Cortes included questions by
the 911 operator about "the shooter's location, description, and
direction of movement, all necessary for the police to conduct their
investigation."' 3  The court reasoned that 911 operators follow
formalized procedures to collect information, and that these
procedures "meet the definition of formal.""' Additionally,
"callers to 911 reporting crimes are likely to know the use to which
the information will be put.' '  Concluding that 911 calls are
testimonial under Crawford, the Cortes court said, "the 911 call
reporting a crime preserved on tape is the modem equivalent, made
' Id. at 404. ("Caller: He's killing him, he's killing him, he's shooting him
again.... He shot him and now he's running. And he shot him two or three
times.").
'o' Id. at 403.
'02 Id. at 405.
'03 Cortes, 781 N.Y.S. 2d at 404. For example, the 911 operator asked which
borough, which direction, and prompted the caller to complete a description of
the shooter's clothes, i.e., "What kind of pants?" Id.
'o4 Id. at 406.
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possible by technology, to the depositions taken by magistrates or
JPs under the Marian committal statue."
°0 6
The Criminal Court of the City of New York reached the
opposite conclusion in Moscat, albeit under different factual
circumstances. °7 Moscat involved a 911 call placed by the
complainant in a domestic violence case.' Noting that the case
"represents an early opportunity for trial courts like this one to
begin to work out in practice the meaning and concrete
applications of the new principles of Sixth Amendment analysis,"
the court concluded that "the 911 call here is not 'testimonial' in
nature as the term 'testimonial' is used in Crawford."'' 9 Instead of
focusing on the factual details of the case at hand, the Moscat
Court analyzed the Crainford holding and its application to calls
made by victims of domestic violence."0
The court reasoned that 911 calls are not initiated by the
police, and are generally not made out of a desire to spark a police
investigation, but rather a desire for immediate assistance."' The
court also noted in passing that 911 operators are, in New York,
civilian police employees." 2 The determinative factor for the
106 ld. at 415.
107 Moscat is the trial court's ruling on a motion in limine to exclude the 911 call
at issue.
108 Moscat, 777 N.Y.S. 2d at 875.
109 Id.
"o Id. at 878. ("The issue is of special importance to courts - like this one -
dedicated to trying cases of alleged domestic violence . . . [because]
complainants in domestic violence cases often refuse to come to court to testify
at trial.").
1'1 Id. at 879.
112 Id. at 878.
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court, however, was that a woman who calls 911 for help "is not
contemplating being a 'witness' in future legal proceedings; she is
usually trying simply to save her own life.""' 3 A 911 call for help,
the court concluded, "is essentially different in nature than the
'testimonial' materials that . . . the Confrontation Clause was
designed to exclude.""' 4 Further, the Moscat Court reasoned that:
The 911 call - usually, a hurried and panicked
conversation between an injured victim and a police
telephone operator - is simply not the equivalent
to a formal pretrial examination by a Justice of the
Peace in Reformation England. If anything, it is the
electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry
for help. The Confrontation Clause was not
directed at such a cry."'
Despite broad - and opposite - conclusions reached by
in Cortes and Moscat, most courts faced with 911 calls decline to
announce a bright-line rule." 6 Instead, these courts prefer case-by-
case analysis to determine whether each 911 call falls into the
category of testimonial or not. The District Court of New York in
State v. Isaac examined Moscat, Cortes, and several other 911-
related cases to conclude that "[t]he law and logic of Cortes have
much to recommend them, but this Court is unable to apply them
"' Moscat, 777 N.Y.S. 2d at 880.
114 d. at 879.
".. Id. at 880.
116 See, e.g., State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("We
reject the State's request for a bright line rule admitting all 911 recordings ....
Instead, we hold that the trial court, on a case-by-case basis, can best assess the
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quite so broadly."' 7 Instead, the Isaac Court interpreted the term
testimonial "reasonably and with restraint" to determine that, under
the particular facts of the case, the 911 call was not admissible."8
Another 911 case, People v. Caudillo, similarly analyzed
the Cortes and Moscat holdings."' In Caudillo, an officer
responding to a 911 domestic violence call observed a car
matching the description of one involved in a gang-shooting earlier
the same evening. 2 ° The license plate and description of the car
were relayed to the police via an anonymous phone call reporting
"men with guns" at a convenience store.'2 ' The officer arrested the
men standing around the car, including Caudillo, who was charged
with assault with a firearm. 1
22
At trial, the prosecution proffered the anonymous 911 tape
including the description of the car, and the trial court admitted it,
concluding that the call "was made under stress . . . and is
admissible."' 23 The Caudillo Court quotes at length from Moscat
and Cortes before undertaking an analysis of the three
formulations of "testimonial hearsay" under Crawford:
First, the 911 call was not "ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent" . . . [because]
the dispatcher . . . was attempting to obtain
information to assist the police in responding
appropriately by providing assistance to any victims
".. State v. Isaac, No. 23398/02, 2004 WL 1389219, at * 8 (N.Y. Dist. Ct.
2004).
11
8 1d at *9, *12.
119 People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
120 Id at 577.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 582-83.
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and apprehending the gunman.... Second, the 911
call cannot be described as an "extrajudicial
statement[] ... contained in formalized testimonial
materials" . . . [because] its purpose was to advise
the police ... so that they could take appropriate
action to protect the community. Finally, the 911
call was not "made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial" . [because t]he caller was simply
requesting help from the police .... 124
Still, the Caudillo Court refrained from announcing a broad
holding with respect to 911 calls, instead concluding that "[u]nder
the circumstances of this case, we believe that the admission of the
911 call did not violate the Confrontation Clause.'
'1 25
Perhaps the most detailed analysis of the admissibility of
911 calls and related statements made to police is the Appellate
Court of Illinois' opinion in People v. West. 1 6 A female cabdriver
was kidnapped, robbed, and raped by two male passengers.
27
When the victim escaped, she ran to a nearby house, where
Dorothy Jackson let her in and placed a call to 911 on the victim's
behalf' 28  During the call, Jackson "would ask the woman
questions posed by the dispatcher, and provide the dispatcher with
the woman's answers," including the location of Jackson's house,
the victim's physical condition, a description of the victim's stolen
124 Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590.
125 Id. at 590.
126 No. 1-02-2358, 2004 111. App. LEXIS 1536, at *1 (Il. App. Ct. 2004).
127 Id. at *2.
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cab, and in what direction the assailants went. 29 At trial, the
prosecution proffered this 911 call, in addition to testimony by
officers who spoke to the victim at the scene, doctors who treated
the victim, and officers who questioned the victim at the hospital.
The court determined that the victim's responses to police
questioning at the hospital were "taken for law enforcement
purposes," and were therefore barred by the Confrontation
Clause. 3 ° The West Court then concluded that the statements
provided by the victim to the officer who arrived at Jackson's
house were "obtained in response to the officer's preliminary task
of attending to the medical concerns of the victim" and were
therefore not testimonial in nature. 3' Similarly, the court held the
victim's statements to doctors "regarding the nature of the alleged
attack, and the cause of her symptoms and pain" were admissible,
but that her statements "concerning fault or identity" were
testimonial under Crawford.1
3 2
The 911 call made by Jackson presented a closer question
for the West Court. The court examined Moscat and Cortes, before
rejecting any bright line rule. Instead, the court concluded that a
129 Id. at *4.
130 Id. at * 11 ("[A]t the time [the victim] was questioned at the hospital, the
defendant was already in custody and ... their questioning of [the victim] was
conducted for the purpose of further investigating the defendant's involvement
and to gather evidence .... ").
"'-West, 2004 Ill. App. LEXIS 1536, at *13 ("[Tjhere is no indication in the
record here that [the responding officer] was aware of the nature of the crime,
the identity[ I of the alleged assailant, or the medical concerns of the victim.
The questions posed by the officer were preliminary in nature ... not for the
Purposes of producing evidence ...
32 Id. at *17-18.
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court should "determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
statement at issue was: (1) given for the purpose of initiating police
action or criminal prosecution; or (2) provided in response to an
interrogation, the purpose of which was to gather evidence for use
in a criminal prosecution. '" 33 If the answer to either question is
yes, the statement is testimonial in nature and barred by Crawford.
However, the West Court explained that "statements which are
made 'to gain immediate official assistance in ending or relieving
an exigent, perhaps dangerous, situation' ... are not testimonial in
nature." '34  This distinction closely mirrors the different factual
circumstances faced by the Cortes and Moscat courts - in one
case, a third-party witness reports a crime to initiate police action;
in another, a victim calls 911 for immediate assistance to end a
dangerous situation.
The West Court ultimately held that the victim's 911
statements "concerning the nature of the alleged attack, [her]
medical needs, and her age and location are not testimonial," while
statements describing "her vehicle, the direction in which her
assailants fled, and the items of personal property they took are
testimonial.' 35
While there is no discernible consensus yet among state
and federal courts faced with post-Crawford determinations of
what, precisely, is a testimonial statement, the case-by-case
approach set forth in Isaac, West, and Caudillo is likely to carry
133 Id. at *22.
134 Id. at *22-23.
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the day. Instead of a bright-line rule holding 911 calls to be either
testimonial or not testimonial, this approach allows the courts to
apply the three formulations of testimonial set forth in Crawford to
determine whether the 911 operator was collecting information for
the purpose of providing emergency assistance, or to aide the
police in a criminal investigation. The former does not seem to fall
under the Crawford definition of testimonial, while the latter is
arguably akin to "[tihe principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed" - ex parte testimony being introduced as
evidence against the accused.'36
What Standards Apply to Non-Testimonial Hearsay?
The second unanswered question after Crauford is what
standards should be applied to non-testimonial hearsay. The
Crawford Court suggested in dicta that "not all hearsay implicates
the Sixth Amendment's core concerns." '137 Thus it is possible that
the Roberts framework still applies to non-testimonial hearsay.
For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut suggested that
"nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as
evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if it satisfies both
prongs of the Roberts test, irrespective of whether the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant."' 38
136 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-63.
' Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 ("Although our analysis in this case casts doubt
on that holding, we need not definitively resolve whether [White v. Illinois]
survives our decision today.").
"' Rivera, 844 A.2d at 201.
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When faced with a non-testimonial statement, the court concluded,
"application of the Roberts test remains appropriate."' 39
The First Circuit agreed that Roberts remained controlling
for non-testimonial hearsay in Horton v. Allen. 4 ' In light of
Crawford's distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements, the First Circuit noted that the challenged statements
"were made during a private conversation . .. [and not] under
circumstances in which an objective person would 'reasonably
believe the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' ""'
Therefore, the First Circuit reasoned that the statements were non-
testimonial and fell outside the scope of Crawford: "Accordingly,
we apply Roberts to determine whether the admission of
[declarant's] hearsay statements violated [defendant's]
Confrontation Clause rights."'
' 2
The Second Circuit in United States v. Saget, however, was
not convinced that Roberts survives for non-testimonial hearsay."'
Saget was convicted of various conspiracy and firearms trafficking
charges, in part on the strength of statements by his separately
indicted co-conspirator, Beckham.' Beckham spoke twice with a
confidential informant who recorded the conversations; portions of
these conversations that implicated Beckham and Saget were
'39 Id. at 202.
140 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004).
141 Id. at 84.
142 id.
14' 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). The court also noted that at least two Supreme
Court Justices would completely overrule Roberts. Id. at 227.
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introduced at Saget's trial.'45 The Second Circuit declared that
Crawford "redefine[d] the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
by holding that the term 'witnesses' does not encompass all
hearsay declarants."'46 Beckham's statements, the Second Circuit
reasoned, "were elicited by an agent of law enforcement officials,
but without his knowledge, and not in the context of the structured
environment of formal interrogation."' 47 Beckham did not have
any reasonable suspicion that the statements he made to the
confidential informant would be used at a criminal trial.
Therefore, the statements were not testimonial under Crawford,
and the Second Circuit was forced to determine whether Roberts
still applied to non-testimonial statements.
The Second Circuit noted that the Crawford Court's
criticisms of Roberts' reliability approach "would apply with equal
force to its application to nontestimonial statements."'48 Although
the Second Circuit declared "the continued viability of Roberts
with respect to non-testimonial statements is somewhat in
doubt,"'49 the Court concluded that "Crawford leaves the Roberts
approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial statements."'5 °
Therefore, the Second Circuit "assume[d] for purposes of this
145 Id.
146 Id. at 227.
147 Id. at 228.
148 Saget, 377 F.3d at 227.
4 Id.
150 id.
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opinion that its reliability analysis continues to apply to control
non-testimonial hearsay."''
VI. CONCLUSION
Although many issues have yet to be resolved, including
the precise definition of testimonial hearsay and what rules apply
to non-testimonial hearsay, it is clear that Crawford mandates a
change in hearsay rules for both state and federal courts. Instead
of allowing hearsay into evidence against a criminal defendant
upon a mere showing of reliability, the Confrontation Clause
requires that the defendant have had an opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant, and that the declarant be unavailable to
testify. Roberts' "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are
no longer enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, at least in the
context of testimonial hearsay. It is also likely that firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions - which the Roberts Court declared did not
offend Sixth Amendment guarantees purely by virtue of being
firmly rooted - must also be subjected to the two-prong Crawford
test.
As the Supreme Court explained in Crawford, this
refinement of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence honors the original
values of the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, this formulation





Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2005
264 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 21
offered as evidence against the accused are tested "in the crucible
of cross-examination." 1
52
152 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371.
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